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The paper considers the macroeconomic transmission of demand and supply shocks in an open economy
under alternative assumptions on whether the zero interest floor (ZIF) is binding. It uses a two-country
general-equilibrium simulation model calibrated to the Japanese economy vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
Negative demand shocks have more prolonged and startling effects on the economy when the ZIF
is binding than when it is not binding. Positive supply shocks can actually extend the period of time
over which the ZIF may be expected to bind. More open economies hit the ZIF for a shorter period
of time, and with less harmful effects. Deflationary supply shocks have different implications according
to whether they are concentrated in the tradables rather than the nontradables sector. Price-level-path
targeting rules are likely to provide better guidelines for monetary policy in a deflationary environment,
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In recent years, quite a few research agendas have sought to pin down the causes of de￿ ation,
mostly focusing on whether falling prices are the result of structural factors or insu¢ cient
aggregate demand. In a nutshell, structural factors such as productivity improvements in
the manufacturing sector are deemed to be responsible for worldwide disin￿ ation, while
weaknesses in demand are typically assumed to be accompanied by di¢ culties in providing
monetary policy stimulus when interest rates hit the zero interest rate ￿ oor (ZIF). Speci￿-
cally, the two views above have represented recurrent themes in both the policy and academic
debate on the performance of the Japanese economy over the last 15 years.1
This paper does not take a speci￿c view about the historical contribution of demand
and supply factors in the evolution of prices in Japan, nor makes any normative or policy
statements on the best course of action in the near future. Rather, it makes the simple point
that a country facing de￿ ationary risks would bene￿t from an integrated approach involving
macroeconomic policies able to respond appropriately to adverse aggregate demand shocks
and deal with the consequences of eventual expansions in supply. Such framework would
not only eliminate de￿ ation in the short run, but also guard against falling into liquidity
traps in the future.
Using a 2-country simulation model calibrated to the Japanese economy, the paper car-
ries out a scenario analysis to illustrate possible di¢ culties in dealing with both demand
and supply shocks when the ZIF is binding. It shows that the e⁄ects of negative demand
shocks on the economy become more protracted and startling when the ZIF is binding than
during normal times when it is not binding. It also shows that positive supply shocks (e.g.
shocks that raise potential output) can extend the period of time during which the ZIF is
expected to be binding, increasing the economy￿ s vulnerability to adverse demand shocks.
In addition, the paper comments on the relative bene￿ts of alternative monetary rules in a
de￿ ationary environment, including price level targeting, in￿ ation-targeting, and price-level-
path targeting rules. The results indicate that price-level-path targeting rules are likely to
provide better guidelines for monetary policy because they are more robust in a de￿ ationary
environment, and ￿ when appropriately designed ￿ have desirable properties in normal
times when the ZIF is not binding.
Throughout the paper we deliberately emphasize the implications of trade and ￿nancial
openness on the e⁄ectiveness of monetary rules in a de￿ ationary environment. This is not to
restate the point made elsewhere (e.g. McCallum 2000 and Svensson 2001) that in an open-
economy context policymakers can escape a liquidity trap by engineering the appropriate
path for the exchange rate. Rather, we show that in the face of negative demand shocks,
more open economies are less vulnerable to the problems associated with the ZIF: other
things being equal, they hit the ZIF for a shorter period of time, and with less harmful
e⁄ects. In addition, openness can reverse the sign of the short-term response of real exchange
rates to shocks. With low openness, de￿ ation results in a very high and persistent rise in real
interest rates that strengthens the home currency in real terms. In contrast, with greater
openness real interest rates are not expected to increase or even remain at a high level for
a long time, and the real exchange rate depreciates on impact.
Finally, the mechanism of transmission of de￿ ationary supply shocks is signi￿cantly
1See e.g. Callen and Ostry (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004), and Hunt and Laxton
(2001, 2003), Hayami (2001), Hayashi and Prescott (2004), Krugman (1998a, 1998b), McCallum (2000),
and Svensson (2001).
1a⁄ected by whether they are concentrated in the tradables or the nontradables sector. In
both cases the appropriate policy response is to reduce interest rates when it is possible
(either now or in the future). However, when the shock is concentrated in the nontradables
sector it results in a depreciation of the real exchange rate and stronger growth in the short
run, reducing the period of time over which the ZIF is binding relative to the case in which
the productivity shock is concentrated in the tradables sector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the basic
theoretical structure of the model and its calibration. Section 4 discusses the relative prop-
erties of price-level-path targeting rules. Section 5 then provides some illustrative scenarios
to support the key arguments in the paper. The last section concludes by providing a brief
discussion of possible future extensions.
2 The structure of the model
This section sets up a general equilibrium two-country model.2 The home country (indexed
by H) is calibrated on Japanese data, while F (the ￿ foreign￿country) indexes the rest of the
world. The size of the world economy is normalized to 1, with sH denoting the size of the
home country and sF = 1 ￿ sH the size of the rest of the world.
There is a common trend for the world economy, whose gross rate of growth between
time t and time ￿ is denoted gt;￿. Each period t represents a quarter. All quantity variables
in the model are expressed in detrended terms.
In each country, there are households, ￿rms, and a government. Households consume a
nontradable ￿nal good and supply di⁄erentiated labor inputs to ￿rms. Firms produce ￿nal
goods, tradable and nontradable intermediate goods, and provide intermediation services.
The public sector consumes domestic goods and services, ￿nanced through lump-sum tax-
ation, and manages short-term interest rates. These sectors are described in more detail
below.
2.1 Final goods
In each country there is a continuum of symmetric ￿rms producing two ￿nal goods, the
consumption good (A) and the investment good (E), under perfect competition. The pro-





















































Three intermediate inputs are used in the production of the consumption good: a basket
of nontradable goods (NA), a basket of domestic tradable goods (QA), and a basket of
imported goods (MA). The elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is
"A, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradables is ￿A.
2Our framework is a variant of the multi-country model presented in the Appendix of Faruqee, Lax-
ton, Muir and Pesenti (2006), and is nested within the Global Economy Model (GEM) developed at the
International Monetary Fund.
2The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the price of one unit of A. The (gross) in￿ ation








As a convention throughout the model, A is the numeraire of the economy and all national
prices are expressed in terms of domestic units of consumption, that is as ratios of CPI.















































where pN, pQ, and pMA are the relative prices of the inputs in terms of consumption























The consumption good sector in the rest of the world and the investment good sector in
both countries are similarly characterized, with self-explanatory changes in notation.
2.2 Demand for intermediate goods
There are di⁄erent varieties (brands) of intermediate inputs that are produced in monopo-
listically competitive markets. In each country there are two kinds of intermediate goods,
tradables and nontradables. Each type is de￿ned over a continuum of mass equal to the
country size. In what follows ￿
H
N > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between inter-
mediate nontradables in the baskets NH
A and NH
E , while ￿
H
T > 1 is the analogous elasticity
for the baskets QH
A and QH
E in the home country and MF
A and MF
E in the rest of the world
(similarly, ￿
F





It is assumed that imports are subject to adjustment costs that temporarily shrink the
production possibility frontier of the importing ￿rms. This assumption allows us to model
realistic dynamics of imports volumes (such as delayed and sluggish adjustment to changes
in relative prices). Denoting with M
H;F
A exports from the rest of the world F to the A sector











The adjustment costs ￿
H;F
MA for a representative ￿rm xH are speci￿ed in terms of the ￿rm￿ s
current import share relative to the past observed import share for the sector as a whole.



















































MA (xH) is the ￿rst derivative of ￿
H;F
MA(xH) with respect to M
H;F
A (xH). To the
extent that all ￿rms xH are symmetric within the consumption sector, there will be a
unique cost-minimizing import price pH
MA. Similar considerations apply to the E sector and
the F country.
2.3 Supply of intermediate goods
The representative nontradable intermediate good in the home country is produced with



































Each ￿rm uses labor (‘) and capital (K) to produce N units of its variety. ￿N > 0 is the
elasticity of input substitution, and ZN is a productivity shock common to all producers
of nontradables. The expression 1 ￿ sLC denotes the share of households that own and
accumulate capital and rent it to ￿rms.

















































Similar considerations hold for the production of tradables. We denote by T the supply of



































2.4 Price setting in the intermediate sector
Consider now pro￿t maximization in the intermediate nontradables sector of the home
country. The representative ￿rm nH sets its nominal price by maximizing the present
discounted value of real pro￿ts. Nominal rigidities are introduced in the form of adjustment
costs occurring when the ￿rm modi￿es its prices. Such adjustment costs are measured in



































t;t = 1) is the appropriate discount rate, to be de￿ned below. As real
variables are detrended and prices are de￿ ated by CPI, eq. (14) includes ￿H
t;￿, the in￿ ation
3Following the notational convention regarding prices, mct, wt and rt denote marginal costs, wages and
rental rates in consumption units.
4rate between time t and time ￿, and gt;￿, the rate of growth of the world trend between




N) and total consumption of nontradables, NH.
The speci￿c parameterization of the adjustment cost ￿H
PN allows the model to engender


















The adjustment cost is related to changes in the price of the nontradable good nH relative
to the past (quarterly) in￿ ation rate observed in the nontradables sector, ￿H
N;t￿2;t￿1. Un-
derlying this speci￿cation is the notion that ￿rms should not be penalized when their price
changes are indexed to some (publicly observable) benchmark such as the past in￿ ation rate
for the sector as a whole.4
As ￿rms are symmetric and charge the same equilibrium price pH(nH) = pH
N, the ￿rst














































Interpreting the previous equation,5 when prices are fully ￿ exible (￿H
PN = 0), the optimiza-











where the gross markup is a negative function of the elasticity of input substitution. De-
viations from markup pricing occur if ￿rms are penalized for modifying their prices in the
short term. The speed of adjustment in response to shocks depends on the trade-o⁄between
current and future expected costs, making the price-setting process forward-looking.







M .6 To the extent that the home country and the rest of
the world represent segmented markets, each ￿rm needs to set two prices, one for domestic
sales and the other for the export market. Without loss of generality, exports are invoiced
(and prices are set) in the currency of the destination market. The adjustment costs are
speci￿ed as in (15), but with possibly di⁄erent parameters in the domestic market and




PM for the home country￿ s ￿rms). If the latter
coe¢ cient is relatively large, the prices of home country H￿ s goods in the foreign markets
F are characterized by signi￿cant stickiness in local currency. In this case, the degree to
which exchange rate ￿ uctuations (and other shocks to marginal costs in country H) pass
4More generally, the adjustment cost could be speci￿ed relative to any variable that converges asymp-
totically to the steady-state in￿ation rate. It is worth emphasizing that the adjustment costs are related to
changes in nominal prices. However, the maximization problem can be easily rewritten in terms of relative
prices, as carried out in this section.
5When linearized around the steady state, eq.(16) can be written as a standard new-Keynesian Phillips
curve under full indexation, or ￿￿H
N;t = ￿mcH
N;t + ￿Et￿￿H








6See Faruqee, Laxton, Muir and Pesenti (2006) for details.
5through onto import prices in country F is rather low. If there were no nominal rigidities
worldwide, export price setting would collapse to a markup rule under the law of one price,













where " is the CPI-based real exchange rate (an increase in " representing a real depreciation
for the home country H). By choosing an appropriate parameterization for ￿PM in both
countries, it is possible to reproduce realistic values for the elasticity of exchange rate pass-
through in the short run. In the long run, however, pass-through is full and the law of one
price holds in both markets.
2.5 Consumer preferences
In each country there is a continuum of households. Some households have access to capital
markets, and others do not. Those who don￿ t have access to capital markets ￿nance their
consumption exclusively through their labor income. This type of consumers is referred to as
￿ non-Ricardian￿or ￿ liquidity-constrained￿ , and indexed with LC. In the home country, they
represent a share sH
LC of domestic households. Those who have access to capital markets are
referred to as ￿ Ricardian￿or ￿ forward-looking￿ , and indexed with FL. In the home country,






The speci￿cation of households￿preferences uses the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man
(1988) (GHH) utility function, adjusted for habit formation and preference shocks. Denoting
with WH
t (jH) the lifetime expected utility of the representative household jH in the home
country, we have:
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￿ (jH) ) (19)
where the instantaneous felicity is a function of consumption C and labor e⁄ort ‘:
uH































In the expressions above ￿
H
t;￿ is the discount rate between time t and time ￿, possibly
di⁄erent across countries. The disutility of labor e⁄ort is assumed to increase with the global
trend (hence the term g
1￿￿
t;￿ in 19).7 The parameter ￿ in (19) and (20) is the reciprocal of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The parameter ￿ which a⁄ects the curvature of
labor disutility is the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity.
There is habit persistence in consumption with coe¢ cient 0 < bc < 1. The term CjH;t￿1
in (20) is past per-capita consumption of household jH￿ s peers, (i.e., either forward-looking
or liquidity-constrained agents). Similarly, there is habit persistence in leisure with coe¢ -
cient 0 < b‘ < 1.8 The terms ZU and ZV are preferences shocks. Households￿preferences
7Appropriate restrictions are imposed to ensure that utility is bounded. In particular, in steady state we
have ￿SSg1￿￿
SS < 1 in all countries.
8The instantaneous felicity is normalized such that in a steady state U , UC and U‘ can all be written as
constant ￿ f(C;‘), where f is some function of steady-state consumption and labor e⁄ort, independent of
the habit persistence coe¢ cients.
6are therefore symmetric within their respective categories but, because of di⁄erent reference
groups in habit formation, they are not symmetric across categories.
2.6 Ricardian households
Ricardian households in the home country hold two nominal bonds, denominated in domestic
and foreign currency, respectively. The domestic bond is in zero net supply in the home
country, and only the foreign-currency denominated bond is traded internationally. BH
t (jH
FL)
denotes the holdings of the domestic bond by households jH
FL, expressed in terms of domestic
consumption units, and BH
F;t(jH
FL) that of international bond, expressed in terms of foreign
consumption units. The nominal returns on these bonds are denoted iH
t and iF
t . They are
paid at the beginning of period t + 1 and known at time t. The two rates are directly
controlled by their respective national governments.
Home agents who take a position in the international bond market must deal with ￿nan-
cial intermediaries who charge a transaction fee ￿H
BF on sales/purchases of the international
bond.9 The net ￿nancial wealth of the home country, expressed in local consumption bas-
kets, is therefore:
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The ￿nancial friction is introduced to guarantee that international net asset positions
follow a stationary process and the economies converge asymptotically to a well-de￿ned
steady state. Speci￿cally, we adopt the following functional form:
1 ￿ ￿H


































F;RAT;SS is the steady-state net asset position of the home country expressed
as a ratio of GDPH.10 This variable measures the degree of international exposure that
￿nancial intermediaries consider appropriate, based on their long-term assessment of the
economy. In our simulation we set bH
F;RAT;SS = 0, as alternative parameterizations leave
our results virtually unchanged.
To understand the role played by ￿H
BF, suppose that ￿
F = ￿
H. In this case, when
the net asset position of the country is equal to its steady-state level of zero, it must be
the case that ￿H
BF = 0 and the return on the international bond is equal to 1 + iF. If
instead home residents are net creditors worldwide, ￿H
BF rises above zero, implying that
the country￿ s households lose an increasing fraction of their international bond returns to
￿nancial intermediaries. By the same token, if the home country is a net debtor worldwide
￿H
BF becomes negative (with a ￿ oor of ￿￿B1), implying that households pay an increasing
intermediation premium on their international debt.11 When rates of time preference diverge
across countries and ￿
H 6= ￿
F, the transaction cost is appropriately modi￿ed to account for
asymmetries in real interest rates across countries. An appropriate parameterization allows
the model to generate realistic dynamics for net asset positions and current account.
9In our model it is assumed that all intermediation ￿rms are owned by the country￿ s residents, and that
their revenue is rebated to domestic households in a lump-sum fashion.
10The concept of GDP in our model will be discussed below.
11More generally, the term bH
F;RAT;SS could be di⁄erent from zero. The above considerations would still
be valid after reinterpreting the concepts of ￿ net creditor￿or ￿ net borrower￿in terms of deviations from the
steady-state level.
7Ricardian households accumulate physical capital which they rent to domestic ￿rms at










t￿1 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 (23)
where ￿
H is the country-speci￿c depreciation rate of capital. Capital accumulation is subject












































where ￿I1, ￿I2 ￿ 0, ZI is a shock to investment demand and gSS is the steady-state growth
rate.
Labor inputs are di⁄erentiated and come in di⁄erent varieties (skills). They are de￿ned
over a continuum of mass equal to the country size. In what follows  
H > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution among labor inputs in the home country. Each household is the monopolistic
supplier of a speci￿c labor input and sets the nominal wage for its speci￿c labor variety.
The representative Ricardian household jH
FL faces a downward-sloping demand for its labor















where ‘H is aggregate labor e⁄ort in the home country. There is sluggish wage adjustment
due to resource costs that are measured in terms of the total wage bill. The adjustment
cost is speci￿ed as the analog of (15) above, with parameter ￿
H
WFL.
Ricardian households own all domestic ￿rms and there is no international trade in claims
on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. All pro￿ts accruing to shareholders, together with all revenue from nominal
and real adjustment as well as revenue from ￿nancial intermediation are distributed in a
lump-sum way to all Ricardian households. In addition, all net taxes paid to the government
are lump-sum.
The representative Ricardian household chooses bond holdings, capital and consumption
paths, and sets its nominal wage to maximize its expected lifetime utility (19) subject to its
budget constraint. The stochastic discount rate DH





































































SS is the real interest rate, gH
SS
8is the (gross steady-state quarterly) rate of growth of the world economy, 1=￿
H
SS is the
rate of time preference, and g￿
SS=￿
H
SS is the ￿ natural￿ rate of the economy.12 In a non-














to the steady-state nominal depreciation rate of the home currency, and relative purchasing
power parity holds.











































can be interpreted as Tobin￿ s Q. In a non-stochastic steady
state 1 + rH
SS=pH
E;SS is equal to the sum of the natural real rate g￿
SS=￿
H
SS and the rate of
capital depreciation ￿.13
Finally, the ￿rst order condition with respect to the nominal wage yields an expression
similar to (16) above. In a non-stochastic steady state the real wage of the Ricardian house-
hold wH












￿ ects monopoly power in the labor market.
The rest of the world is similarly characterized. However, there are no intermediation
costs in entering the international bond market for the Ricardian households of the F coun-
try.
2.7 Liquidity-constrained households
Liquidity-constrained households have no access to capital markets. However, they face a












As in the case of Ricardian households, they can set optimally their wages using their market
power, subject to adjustment costs with parameter ￿
H
WLC. It is assumed that redistribution
policies provide to these households the income losses associated with wage adjustment,































12International di⁄erences in natural rates can arise from asymmetric rates of time preference. They are
accounted for in the de￿nition of ￿B in (22).
13The expectation operator on the left hand side of (30) is needed as shocks to the trend gt;t+1 are not
part of the information set at time t. This is because variables are expressed as deviations from the current
trend. An alternative speci￿cation which expresses variables as deviations from the lagged trend would
make little di⁄erence.

















Similar considerations hold in the F country.
2.8 Government
Public spending is limited to nontradable goods, both ￿nal and intermediate. In per-capita
terms, GH
C is government consumption, GH
I is government investment, and GH
N denotes
public purchases of intermediate nontradables. Government spending is ￿nanced through
lump-sum taxation
The governments control the short-term rates iH
t and iF
t . In the home country, monetary
policy encompasses both in￿ ation and price level targeting and is speci￿ed in terms of an


























The current interest rate it is a function of the current ￿ neutral￿rate ineut
t , de￿ned as the
quarterly nominal interest rate that would prevail if the real interest rate were equal to the
natural rate and in￿ ation were equal to its target:









The current rate can di⁄er from neutral to account for the gap between current year-on-year
in￿ ation (￿H
t￿4;t) and its target (￿H
TAR t￿4;t), as well as the gap between the current price
level CPIH
t and its target CPIH








All nominal prices are normalized at the initial time t = 0 such that CPI0 = CPITAR;0 = 1.
We refer to the expression (35) as a Price-Level-Path Targeting (PLPT) rule when the target
rate of in￿ ation is positive and a Price-Level Targeting (PLT) rule when the target rate of
in￿ ation is zero.
In general, the rule (35) could be modi￿ed to include policy responses to a set of other
variables (such as output gap, output growth rate, exchange rate, current account etc.)
expressed as deviations from their targets. In a steady state when all targets are reached it
must be the case that the real interest rate is equal to the ￿ natural￿rate of the economy, a
function of the long-term growth rate and the discount rate:
1 + iH













In the rest of the world monetary policy is similarly speci￿ed, but the interest rate rule
is assumed to only respond to deviations of in￿ ation from the target.
102.9 Market clearing
The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraints and market clearing
conditions.













































The ￿nal good A can be used for private (by both liquidity-constrained and forward-
























All pro￿ts and intermediation revenue accrue to Ricardian households. Market clearing in
the asset market requires:
BH













F = 0 (47)







































































112.10 Measuring output and current account



























The left hand side of (51) is country H￿ s current account, the ￿rst term on the right hand
side are net factor payments from the rest of the world to country H and TBAL is the trade









































Tables 1-5 report the parameterization of the home and foreign blocks in the simulations.
The steady-state ratios have been set to match actual national accounts data and the key
behavioral parameters have been chosen using information from the existing literature￿ see
Batini, N￿ Diaye, and Rebucci (2005)￿ as well as empirical evidence gathered in previous work
using the International Monetary Fund￿ s Global Economy Model (GEM).
The home country, Japan, accounts for 111
2 percent of the world and the remaining
countries F account for the remaining 881
2 percent (Table 1). The steady state consumption-
to-GDP ratio is lower in Japan than in the rest of the world (57 percent compared with
65 percent), but investment, government expenditure, exports, and imports, are higher in
Japan than in the rest of the world. There are also di⁄erences in the key parameters that
characterize consumption, production, and the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables.
With regard to consumption behavior (Table 2), the two regions have similar shares of
consumers facing liquidity constraints (40 percent). At the same time, it is assumed that
consumers in Japan are more patient than those in the rest of the world with a rate of
time preference ￿ i.e. the inverse of the subjective discount factor ￿ of 1.43 compared
with 2.59. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=￿ is assumed to be identical across
regions and consumers (liquidity-constrained and forward looking) and set to 5. Combining
these three parameters with a steady-state balanced-growth trend rate gSS for the world
economy of 2 percent (in annualized terms) implies a real interest rate of 1.83 percent in
Japan and 3 percent for the world economy. In the case of Japan, this level of real interest
rate is consistent with the average real long-term interest rate during 1995-1999. For the
remaining countries, the lower bound of the typical calibration of 3-4 percent for the real
interest rate has been used (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)).
12The parameter of habit persistence in consumption, bc, is set at a high value of 0.91
for both regions, consistent with values used in previous studies such as Bayoumi, Lax-
ton, and Pesenti (2004). This assumption, together with the high intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, generates realistic short-run paths for the dynamics of consumption and
the hump-shaped response to changes in interest rates. More conservative values used in
sensitivity analysis do not alter signi￿cantly the long-term properties of the model.14 We
calibrate the Frisch elasticity at 0.4, slightly higher than the 0.05-0.33 range of estimates
obtained using micro data but well below benchmark values in macroeconomic models, and
set the habit persistence in leisure, b‘, at 0.75 for both regions and types of consumers.
As regards production, it is assumed that the tradable sector is more capital intensive
than the non-tradable sector in both regions. The elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital ￿ is set at 0.75 in both the tradable sector and the non-tradable sector for both
regions. Such a value proved useful in helping to reduce the sensitivity of capital to changes
in interest rates. The bias toward the use of capital ￿K has been set to replicate the actual
average investment-to-GDP ratio. The depreciation rate ￿ is assumed to be 2 percent per
quarter (8 percent a year).
The markups on tradable and non-tradables, which re￿ ect the pricing power of ￿rms
under monopolistic competition as a function of the elasticities ￿ and  , are set using
estimates from Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) for Japan and the rest of the world
(Table 3). These estimates indicate lower markups over marginal costs for both the tradable
sector and the non-tradable sector in the case of the rest of world compared with Japan,
suggesting a lower degree of competition in the goods market of the latter region. For the
labor market however, it is assumed that agents have the same pricing power in both regions
with a real wage markup of 20 percent.
With regards to the dynamics of the key macro aggregates (Table 4), it is largely de-
pendent upon the assumptions made on the adjustment cost parameters associated to the
nominal and real aggregates. In particular, the adjustment cost parameter for wages is set
at 400, broadly in line with a four-quarter contract under Calvo-style pricing. The adjust-
ment cost parameter on prices is also set at 400, consistent with a sacri￿ce ratio of 2.1. The
adjustment cost on import prices is set at 3200, which implies a short-run pass-through of
the exchange rate of about 0.5. The adjustment cost on import volumes is set at 0.95 to
mimic a slow response of import volumes to changes in demand and relative prices. The
transactions costs parameters in the bond market are chosen so as to ensure a slow reversion
of the net asset position between the two regions to its steady-state value.
Finally, as regards the parameterization of the monetary reaction functions (Table 5), this
is such that both regions are committed to price stability with, however, marked di⁄erences
in the policy rules. As remarked above, it is assumed that the home country follows a PLPT
rule. The purpose of this assumption is to simulate the e⁄ects that a policy commitment
to achieve a speci￿ed target path for the price level would have on the macroeconomy of a
country facing disin￿ ationary risks, consistent with the suggestion of several studies that a
PLPT rule is an e⁄ective means to mitigate the implications of the zero bound on nominal
interest rates.15 More speci￿cally, the baseline PLPT rule uses a coe¢ cient of 2 on the
14Because of the speci￿cation of the utility function (20) in our model, the value of ￿ plays a lesser role
in determining the properties of the steady-state allocation than under alternative parameterizations (e.g.
additive separability or Cobb-Douglas). However, the choice of ￿ ￿ interacted with habit persistence bC
￿ critically a⁄ects the dynamic properties of the model.
15See e.g. Reifschneider and Williams (1999), Hunt and Laxton (2001), and Eggertson and Woodford
(2003).
13current quarter gap between the year-on-year in￿ ation and its target and a coe¢ cient of
0.5 on the current quarter gap between the price level and its target. Under this policy
rule the price level would only be expected to return very gradually back to the target path
and in a manner that pays su¢ cient consideration for its implications for the real economy.
However, for illustrative purposes we will also show a scenario where we assume a very
aggressive policy response that attempts to bring the price level back to the target much
faster (by assuming the weight on the price level gap is 2.5 instead of 0.5).
The interest rate rule for the rest of the world uses a coe¢ cient of 2 on the current
quarter gap between the year-on-year in￿ ation and its target. The year-on-year in￿ ation
target is set at 0.5 percent for Japan, which is broadly in line with the average in￿ ation rate
during 1995-1999, and 2.5 percent for the rest of the world.
4 PLPT rules versus other rules
It is well known that standard in￿ ation-targeting rules that only respond to actual or ex-
pected in￿ ation developments ￿such as the Taylor (1993) rule ￿ may give rise to either
indeterminacy or instability in the presence of the ZIF. A number of solutions have been
suggested to overcome stability problems while guarding against the risks of de￿ ation. Hy-
brid rules where the central bank commits to adjusting a short-term interest rate in response
to both in￿ ation and deviations between the price level and a ￿xed price level path have
received increasing attention in the literature and policy debate.16 The next section shows
that targeting an upward-sloping price level path (PLPT) not only helps eliminate a de￿ a-
tionary spiral once the ZIF has been hit, but it can also reduce the risks of hitting the ZIF
itself.
Some skepticism however has been expressed on the e⁄ectiveness, and even the desir-
ability, of such rules. It is sometimes argued that, in the presence of structural in￿ ation
persistence, PLT and PLPT rules can result in excessive instability of the real activity, and
might push an economy into de￿ ation in circumstances where the actual price level is signi￿-
cantly higher than the target. Another criticism is that PLPT rules are successful in models
because they exploit expectational channels, but in the real world may be less credible than
pure in￿ ation targeting (IT) rules. In light of this debate, before turning to our main results
we ￿nd it useful to use our analytical apparatus to illustrate why we consider these concerns
to be unwarranted.
Let￿ s ￿rst consider the case in which the current price level is severely misaligned relative
to the target. Speci￿cally, Figure 1 considers a scenario where the initial price level is 5
percent above a constant price level target, and the central bank pursues an overly aggressive
policy of returning the price level back to target within 2 years.17 In terms of our model,
the central bank adopts a PLT rule with a high weight of 2.5 on the price level gap in the
monetary reaction function. We emphasize that this scenario is analyzed merely to visualize
the concerns above, according to which such a policy conduct would push the economy into
a de￿ ationary spiral.
16See among others Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2000), Eg-
gertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004), Hunt and Laxton (2001, 2003), Krugman (1998a, 1998b), McCallum
(2000), Svensson (2001).
17We assume that all other variables are initially at their steady-state values, so that we can focus specif-
ically on a situation where the price level is initially misaligned relative to the target without additional
deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
14Indeed, in this example interest rates rise to double digits in the short run and then
decline over time as the price level falls toward the target. In the presence of structural
in￿ ation persistence such a policy eventually requires interest rates to fall signi￿cantly below
the neutral rate (the dashed line in the bottom right chart of Figure 1). But, as the neutral
rate is quite low because of the zero slope of the price-level path target, there is a substantial
chance that the economy hits the ZIF, with negative repercussions on real activity. In fact,
in our scenario the economy hits the ZIF in the second and third year of the simulation,
resulting in a large recession. It is important to understand that there are two forces at
work here that result in the economy hitting the ZIF. The ￿rst is that a price level target
is associated with a very low neutral rate. The second is that the central bank is assumed
to ignore or disregard the implications for the real economy of trying to hit the target price
level over too short of a horizon.18
Under the same circumstances, could an appropriately designed PLPT rule do better?
The answer is certainly yes. Figure 2 reconsiders the above experiment under two alternative
assumptions. First, the central bank now follows a PLPT rule where the annual slope of
the price level path has been set to 2.5 percent. Second, the PLPT rule has been calibrated
to avoid the undesirable consequences of an over-aggressive stance when the central bank
attempts to close the price level gap too quickly: this simulation assumes a coe¢ cient of 0.5
on the price level gap in the monetary reaction function.
The higher slope for the price level path, relative to the case of a PLT rule, raises the
neutral policy rate by 2.5 percentage points and creates a signi￿cant bu⁄er that allows
rates to decline without hitting the ZIF. Note that the PLPT rule still requires a signi￿cant
increase in interest rates in the short run. Also, as in￿ ation declines, the interest rate still
undershoots the neutral rate. But the contraction in real activity is now much less severe
than it was in the previous case.
With regard to the concern that PLPT rules might be less credible than pure IT rules,
it is important to emphasize that PLPT rules would only be used as a guideline for com-
municating current and future policy actions, just like IT rules are currently used to help
construct and publish forecasts in countries that have adopted IT regimes. As is the case in
the latter regimes, the current stance of monetary policy is based on a plan for bringing in-
￿ ation back to target gradually, and in a manner that is cognizant of the implications for the
real side of the economy. Under a PLPT rule the central bank￿ s forecast for in￿ ation would
continue to represent an ideal intermediate target that is based on available information,
and would need to be updated in a timely manner in response to new information.
The only signi￿cant di⁄erence between a PLPT rule and a pure IT rule is that it would
generally take longer for the central bank￿ s forecast for in￿ ation to be equal its long-run
target rate, as periods of above average in￿ ation would have to be o⁄set by periods of
below-average in￿ ation to return the price level back towards its target path. It is di¢ cult
to argue that such a rule would be less credible than simple in￿ ation-targeting rules, as
an important prerequisite for a policy rule to be credible is that it has to be robust to
di⁄erent environments. We take as self-evident that pure in￿ ation-targeting rules, which by
their very nature have to be abandoned when the ZIF binds, can never be as credible as an
appropriately designed PLPT rule. Arguably, this point is even stronger in open economies.
18Similar considerations hold in the case of in￿ation-targeting regimes. Critics have argued that IT could
result in excessive variability in the real economy if central banks were committed to bringing in￿ation back
to target without concern for real objectives. In practice, central banks that have adopted IT regimes have
clearly recognized that, due to lags in the monetary transmission mechanism, it is not possible nor desirable
to hit the target at each point in time.
15As Svensson (2001) and others have pointed out, monetary authorities can always build
anti-de￿ ationary credibility by depreciating the exchange rate su¢ ciently to generate the
expectation of a higher price level in the future.
5 Some illustrative scenarios
In what follows, we consider a baseline and three illustrative scenarios to show the impli-
cations of the ZIF in the presence of shocks that require easing monetary conditions. We
achieve this by simulating the economy￿ s responses to such shocks when the ZIF is binding,
and by comparing them with similar responses when the ZIF is not binding.
The ￿ base case￿aims to replicate a number of economic conditions in the recent past of
Japan, including low productivity growth and de￿ ation. This baseline scenario is assumed to
be the result of both low levels of domestic demand and a medium-term trend productivity
growth that is below the long-term steady-state growth rate. More precisely, it is assumed
that over some period of time (two decades) ZH
T and ZH
N fall so that productivity grows
a full 1 percentage point below the steady-state growth rate of 2 percent. Note that this
steady-state rate represents the growth rate of GDP in the long run as the analysis abstracts
from population growth.
The ￿rst scenario envisages a negative shock to domestic demand. The second and third
scenarios consider shocks to supply that raise the underlying rate of productivity growth in
the tradables sector and the nontradables sector, respectively. These two scenarios allow for
an analysis of the implications of shocks to real exchange rates and the dynamics of macro
adjustments along the lines of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).19 Before we proceed,
it is worth emphasizing that our scenarios are purely illustrative and designed to illustrate
the major mechanisms at work, as well as the key substantive issues involved with the ZIF.
Needless to say, they are not intended to provide a plausible baseline forecast ￿ nor to
underscore policy recommendations ￿ for the Japanese economy.
5.1 An illustrative baseline with binding ZIF and temporary de￿ a-
tion
The solid lines in Figure 3 illustrate our baseline scenario over a time horizon of ten years
(40 quarters) for the following variables: GDP growth, the price level and its target path,
CPI in￿ ation, nominal and real exchange rate, nominal and real interest rates, GDP growth
in the rest of the world, the trade balance, and the current account balance. In the baseline
scenario of Figure 3 the ZIF is assumed to be binding for the ￿rst seven quarters. In the
short run, there is de￿ ation ￿ the combination of falling prices and low growth ￿ but over
the medium term the economy recovers and in￿ ation expectations increase.
As indicated earlier, recovery from the ZIF is ensured by assuming that monetary policy
is committed to following a rule where interest rates are adjusted to move the price level
gradually toward a ￿xed price level path that rises at the rate of 0.5 percent per annum.
Expectations of higher in￿ ation ￿ which result in a reduction of the real interest rate ￿
combined with a weaker yen raise aggregate demand and boost actual in￿ ation. Growth
19The conditions for the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect in the model depend on the combination of parame-
ter values for the degree of home bias in consumption preferences, the elasticities of substitution between
domestically-produced tradables and importables, as well as the elasticities of substitution between non-
traded and traded goods.
16stabilizes at a rate that remains below its steady-state level for some time beyond the
simulation horizon.
In the baseline scenario, the trade and current account are in surplus in the short run, in
de￿cit over the medium term (after about 5 years), and in balance in the steady state. The
short-run surplus results from lower demand and slower productivity growth. The medium-
term de￿cit re￿ ects the positive income e⁄ects that short-run surpluses have engendered,
boosting domestic demand, and hence helping to ensure that in the steady state the desired
net asset position returns to zero (the latter is a simplifying assumption that plays no role
in our analysis).
As productivity growth remains below its steady-state rate in both sectors, the real
exchange rate appreciates over time. To understand this point, observe that in our model
the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect is operational: an increase in productivity in the tradables
(nontradables) sector results in a permanent appreciation (depreciation) of the real exchange
rate. Because the size of the nontraded sector is larger than the size of the traded goods
sector, an equal increase in productivity in both sectors will result a permanent depreciation.
The baseline assumes that productivity growth is lower than the steady-state rate of growth
for two decades, representing a large negative shock in both sectors spread over a long
period of time which strengthens the real exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate also
appreciates over time but at an even faster rate than the real exchange rate, because of
the assumptions of implicit long-term in￿ ation objectives of 0.5 percent in Japan and 2.5
percent in the rest of the world.
5.2 Responses to a negative shock to domestic demand
The dashed lines in Figure 3 are based on an alternative scenario in which domestic demand
turns out to be weaker than in the baseline case. This new scenario is generated by assuming
that negative shocks to ZH
U and ZH
I further reduce consumption and investment spending.
In this scenario, the ZIF binds for four additional quarters and the de￿ ationary spiral is
more severe with signi￿cantly slower growth in the short run. As was the case in the
baseline scenario, this spiral is held in check by an eventual increase in in￿ ation expectations
as agents recognize that the monetary authorities are prepared to provide the necessary
accommodation to return the price level gradually back to target.
Real interest rates rise signi￿cantly in the short run, but then start to fall dramati-
cally in anticipation of future increases in the price level even before the ZIF is no longer
binding. The scenario shows the potential bene￿ts of targeting an upward-sloping path for
the price level instead of a ￿xed long-term in￿ ation rate: in fact, the latter would result
in an unstable de￿ ationary spiral. Note that under the scenario presented in Figure 3 the
short-run spillovers to the rest of the world are negative, albeit they are relatively small and
short-lived.
Figure 4 considers exactly the same shocks that were used to generate the two scenarios
discussed above. However, now we study the counterfactual implications of letting interest
rates fall (paradoxically) below zero. Needless to say, these simulations do not represent a
potential ￿ case￿for negative interest rates in the real world, but simply allow us to study
the direct implications of an economy where the ZIF binds relative to an economy where it
does not. In fact, the results without binding ZIF are far less startling than with binding
ZIF, as the reduction in nominal interest rates in the short run results in faster declines in
real interest rate and makes the downturn in the economy much shorter-lived (Figure 4).
The scenarios above might be interpreted as simply showing the bene￿ts of choosing a
17high enough in￿ ation target that is explicitly designed to avoid the ZIF from binding. They
actually go well beyond that, by demonstrating the equilibrating properties of monetary
policy rules that embody PLPT. For example, in a fully-stochastic setting it is impossible
to rule out hitting the ZIF with pure in￿ ation-targeting rules, even if the in￿ ation target
is set as high as 2.0 percent ￿ see Hunt and Laxton (2003). Since a monetary policy rule
that embodies PLPT will result in larger and more persistent declines in interest rates in
response to de￿ ationary shocks than a pure in￿ ation-targeting rule, such a rule explicitly
takes the potential deleterious implications of the ZIF into account, and in practice it works
in the direction of reducing the probability of actually hitting the ZIF.
Figure 4 also debunks a common ￿ strawman￿argument against PLPT, which is that
pursuing such rules in normal times would result in excessive variability in the business
cycle in the presence of signi￿cant structural in￿ ation persistence. Such arguments are
usually based on the assumption that the slope of the price-level target path is zero, or are
based on unrealistic assumptions about the degree of structural in￿ ation persistence in the
economy. As can be seen in Figure 4, as long as PLPT rules are realistically designed ￿
substantially, in order to bring the price level back to target very gradually ￿ they should
not be expected to have harmful e⁄ects on cyclical variability in normal times when there
is a small risk that the ZIF will become binding.20
To conclude this section, it is worthwhile to focus brie￿ y on the implications of openness.
Figure 5 reconsiders the same scenarios as in Figure 3, but now the degree of openness in
the world economy is twice as large as the base case.21 Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 3
suggests that a more open economy is less vulnerable to the problems associated with the
ZIF, in the sense that the same negative demand shock results in hitting the ZIF for a much
shorter period of time, and with less harmful e⁄ects, relative to our base case. In the case
with more openness the negative demand shock causes the real exchange rate to depreciate
in the short run, while it leads to an appreciation on impact under low openness. In both
cases de￿ ation results in very high real interest rates in the short run. With relatively low
openness the real interest rate rise is persistent enough to strengthen the home currency in
real terms: real interest rates actually increase for one year after the shock. But in a regime
of high openness real interest rates are not expected to increase or even remain at a high
level for a long time: in fact they start falling immediately after the shock, and the real
exchange rate depreciates on impact. These results help explain why a model with a very
low degree of openness can become unstable, as a result of the change in the sign of the real
exchange rate response.
5.3 Responses to positive supply shocks
The solid lines in Figure 6 reproduce the same baseline scenario discussed earlier in Figure
3, but the dashed lines now illustrate an alternative scenario in which higher productivity
growth in the tradables sector is added to the baseline scenario, possibly re￿ ecting the
20Most in￿ation-targeting central banks usually choose a target signi￿cantly above zero partly because
of measurement problems, but also because of concerns that too low a target runs the risk of periodically
hitting the ZIF in response to shocks. In fact, most in￿ation-targeting countries typically choose a target
such as 2.0 percent or 2.5 percent, which is signi￿cantly higher than what measurement bias alone would
suggest ￿ see Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005). Using stochastic simulations, Hunt and Laxton (2003)
argue that for countries with signi￿cant nominal and real rigidities even an in￿ation target as high as 2
percent may be too low, because such targets combined with conventional monetary policy rules that ignore
price-level considerations do not completely rule out hitting the ZIF.
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18outcome of structural transformations in the labor and product markets. Figure 7 simply
repeats the analysis with the same shocks, but once again in this case interest rates are
allowed to fall below zero. In these scenarios an increase in productivity in the tradables
sector results in an appreciation in both the short run and the long run.
As was the case for the negative demand shocks earlier, the appropriate policy response
is to reduce nominal interest rates relative to the baseline scenario whenever possible (either
now if the ZIF is not binding, or in the future if it is binding). The rationale, however,
is di⁄erent. In the earlier scenario of negative demand shocks, a commitment to easing
monetary conditions prevented demand from falling further and ensured the injection of
su¢ cient nominal stimulus to stop an ongoing de￿ ationary spiral. In the scenarios of Figures
6 and 7, instead, the positive supply shock actually raises output. However, if the economy
starts at the ZIF, supply shocks can extend the period of time over which the ZIF remains
binding. In our particular example it extends the period of time the ZIF binds by 2 quarters.
Prima facie comparison of Figures 6 and 7 might suggest that there are only minor
complications associated with hitting the ZIF for a longer period of time, as there are small
di⁄erences between the pro￿les for real activity and in￿ ation when the ZIF binds and when
it does not. Unfortunately, this type of inference derived from deterministic simulation
scenarios underestimates the potential complications of supply shocks in the real world, as
it implicitly assumes that no further demand or supply shocks would occur in the future.
There could be instances where an economy, which is expected to remain for some time at
the ZIF as growth-enhancing structural reforms proceed, were to be hit by a new series of
negative aggregate demand shocks. In this case the e⁄ects of these new shocks would be
ampli￿ed because they would be ￿ layered￿upon a scenario in which the ZIF was already
binding.
To analyze the implications of supply shocks that are concentrated in the nontradables
sector, we repeat the above analysis under the assumption that the productivity growth
shock is concentrated in the N sector of our model ￿ see Figures 8 and 9. A similar story
emerges. The appropriate policy response is to reduce interest rates when it is possible
(either now or in the future), and in the case where the ZIF is binding it binds for longer.
However, in this case because the shock is concentrated in the nontradables sector it results
in a depreciation of the real exchange rate and stronger growth in the short run. As a
consequence, when the ZIF is not binding interest rates decline in the short run, but then rise
after 2 years to contain the ensuing in￿ ationary pressures stemming from the depreciation
of the currency. In this case, the ZIF binds for only one additional quarter relative to the
baseline, compared with two quarters when the productivity shock was concentrated in the
tradables sector.
5.4 Raising the in￿ ation target to 2.5 percent
The simulations reported earlier highlight the potential bene￿ts of moving the economy
away from the ZIF as quickly as possible, once the economy hits it.22 Figures 10 and 11
illustrate the implications of increasing the slope of the price level target path in the baseline
from 0.5 percent to 2.5 percent, per annum.
Figure 10 considers the case where the ZIF is binding initially. In this case, if such a
policy were perceived to be credible, it would result in an increase of in￿ ation expectations
22A growing empirical literature shows that central banks in in￿ation-targeting countries have had sig-
ni￿cant success in anchoring long-term in￿ation expectations to their targets ￿ see in particular Levin,
Natalucci and Piger (2004), Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005), G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
19in the short run, and the period of time over which the ZIF is expected to be binding would
shrink. In this particular example, the home country economy is at the ZIF for 4 quarters
instead of the 7 quarters in the baseline scenario. Figure 11 reports the case where the
ZIF is not binding. Interest rates decline in the short run, providing the reduction in real
interest rates needed to stimulate aggregate demand. This increases in￿ ation gradually to
its new permanently higher level.
It is sometimes argued that, in practice, it may be di¢ cult to implement such a policy
when the ZIF is binding, because the lower real interest rates which are required to stimulate
aggregate demand in the short run work entirely through an expectational channel, and by
de￿nition cannot be backed up in terms of a reduction in nominal short-term interest rates.
However, this argument assumes that the central bank will not take other measures to ensure
the credibility of the policy strategy. This assumption seems highly unrealistic. Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003, 2004) highlight that both monetary and ￿scal authorities face a large
menu of actions, including the purchase of government securities and real estate assets, to
guarantee their commitment to achieving higher price levels in the future. And, as already
mentioned, in the context of an open economy it is always possible to engineer su¢ cient
exchange rate depreciation to generate credible expectations of a higher price level in the
future.
6 Conclusion
Using a two-country simulation model calibrated to the Japanese economy, this paper has
carried out a scenario analysis to illustrate possible di¢ culties in dealing with both demand
and supply shocks when the ZIF is binding. The key results concerning the implications
of openness on the e⁄ectiveness of monetary rules in a de￿ ationary environment have been
highlighted at length and need not be rehashed here. Instead, we conclude by commenting
brie￿ y on a few directions for further research.
The basic insight of the large body of literature on policy rules is that it is not essential
to derive optimal rules based on speci￿c models or views about the economy, but rather
to search for rules that are robust across di⁄erent environments and circumstances. The
arguments in the paper, which are based on illustrative scenarios, suggest that PLPT rules
should be expected to have signi￿cant advantages over either pure IT rules or pure PLT
rules (to some extent, PLPT rules combine the best from both IT and PLT approaches).
The obvious extension would be to evaluate alternative rules in a fully stochastic environ-
ment and, in fact, doing so would likely strengthen the bene￿ts of PLPT rules over their
alternatives.
For example, the analysis has ignored the permanent welfare consequences and dead-
weight losses that would be associated with rules that periodically allow for the occurrence
of long de￿ ationary spirals. Also, relative to IT rules, our analysis above has abstracted
from the possible welfare bene￿ts that PLPT rules could generate, stemming from lower
uncertainty about the future price level. While the e⁄ects of uncertainty about price level
movements has perhaps been overlooked in this literature, it may become a key issue over
time as the policy debate focuses on the demographic consequences of population aging.
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(Percentage Shares of GDP)
H F
Private Consumption CSS=GDPSS 56.97 64.86
Forward-looking consumers CFL;SS=GDPSS 50.18 56.12
Liquidity-constrained consumers CLC;SS=GDPSS 6.80 8.74
Private Investment pE;SSISS=GDPSS 23.53 17.14
Public Expenditure GSS=GDPSS 19.50 18.00
Trade balance TBALSS=GDPSS 0.00 0.00
Imports IMSS=GDPSS 11.03 1.45
Consumption Goods pMA;SSMA;SS=GDPSS 7.62 0.72
Investment Goods pME;SSME;SS=GDPSS 3.42 0.73
Net Foreign Assets bF;RAT;SS 0.00 0.00
Share of World GDP (percent) s 11.59 88.41
Table 2: Households and Firms Parameters
H F
Share of liquidity constrained consumers sLC 0.40 0.40







Depreciation rate ￿ 0.02 0.02
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=￿ 5.00 5.00
Habit persistence in consumption bc 0.91 0.91
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor & 2.50 2.50
Habit persistence in labor b‘ 0.75 0.75
Tradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production ￿T 0.75 0.75
Weight of capital ￿KT 0.73 0.57
Nontradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production ￿N 0.75 0.75
Weight of capital ￿KN .70 0.56
Final Consumption Goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ￿A 2.50 2.50
Weight of domestic goods ￿A 0.59 0.97
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables "A 0.50 0.50
Weight of tradable goods ￿A 0.36 0.34
Final Investment Goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ￿E 2.50 2.50
Weight of domestic goods ￿E 0.81 0.96
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables "E 0.50 0.50
Bias towards tradable goods ￿E 0.77 0.75
23Table 3: Price and Wage Markups
H F
Tradables
Markup ￿T=(￿T ￿ 1) 1.26 1.18
Nontradables
Markup ￿N=(￿N ￿ 1) 1.29 1.23
Wages
Markup  =(  ￿ 1) 1.20 1.20
Table 4: Nominal and Real Rigidities
H F
Real Rigidities
Capital accumulation ￿I1 1.00 1.00
Investment changes ￿I2 78.00 78.00
Imports of consumption goods ￿MA 0.95 0.95
Imports of investment goods ￿ME 0.95 0.95
Nominal Rigidities
Wages of liquidity-constrained consumers ￿WLC 400 400
Wages of forward-looking consumers ￿WFL 400 400
Prices of domestic tradables ￿PQ 400 400
Prices of nontradables ￿PN 400 400
Prices of imports ￿PM 3200 3200
Table 5: Base-Case Monetary Policy Reaction Function Parameters
H F
In￿ ation gap !￿ 2.0 2.0
Price Level gap !P 0.5 0.0
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33Figure 10: Base Case and New Scenario with an Annual 2.5% Slope in the Price Level
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